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Recent Decisions
LABOR RELATIONS-UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES-EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO
MUTUAL AID OR PROTECTION-EMPLOYEE'S

RIGHT TO PRESENCE OF

UNION REPRESENTATIVE AT AN INVESTIGATORY INTERVIEW-The

Su-

preme Court of the United States has upheld a finding by the National Labor Relations Board that an employer's denial of an employee's request for the presence of a union representative at an
investigatory interview which the employee reasonably believes
might result in disciplinary action is an unfair labor practice.
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
In June, 1972, Leura Collins was interviewed by the manager and

a member of the security department of the J. Weingarten, Inc.
store where she worked dispensing food at a lobby operation. The
interview concerned a report that Collins had not paid in full for an

item she had purchased. During her questioning Collins made several requests for the presence of a union representative, but each
request was denied.' After she was cleared of the original charge,
Collins spontaneously remarked that all she ever took from the store

was her free lunch. As a result, the interview was reopened; free
lunches were not provided at the lobby food operation where Collins
worked, although they were provided at the retail lunch counter

operation where Collins had formerly been assigned.2 Collins again
requested and was again denied the presence of a union steward
during this phase of the interview. After questioning Collins, Loss
Prevention Specialist Hardy prepared a statement including an
estimated bill for past lunches, which Collins refused to sign.'
1. The administrative law judge found that while Collins may have been inarticulate, she
had effectively expressed her request for a union representative's presence; she had legitimately understood an answer that such representation was not necessary as a denial of her
request. J. Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 448 (1973).
2. There was some confusion on company policy regarding free lunches. J. Weingarten,
Inc. operated a chain of some 100 stores. The older stores had retail lunch counters, but in
the newer stores counters had been replaced by lobby food operations. Collins had been
informed that she was entitled to a free lunch when she was hired at a store which had a retail
lunch counter operation; according to her own uncontradicted testimony, she had never been
informed that the policy was different when she was transferred to a newer store which had
a lobby food operation. Indeed, most if not all of the employees where she worked, including
the lobby department manager, took free lunches. Id, at 446-47.
3. It does not appear that Collins was ever disciplined or compelled to make restitution
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After Collins told her union steward of these events, the union4
filed an unfair labor practice charge based on the denial of her
requests for union representation.' The issue before the National
Labor Relations Board6 was whether an employer's denial of an
employee's request for representation at an investigatory interview7
was an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act' because this denial interfered with, restrained,
or coerced the right of an employee, guaranteed by section 7 of the
Act, "to engage in. . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . ... I The Board
affirmed the administrative law judge's conclusion that denial of
union representation constituted an unfair labor practice.'" The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, denied enforcement
of the Board's cease and desist order directing the company to grant
employee requests for representation at investigatory interviews."
for the lunches she received. She was instructed by the store manager, however, not to discuss
the interview with anyone because it was a private matter between her and the company. Id.
at 448.
4. The Union involved was Retail Clerks Local 455.
5. The union also alleged an unfair labor practice had been committed because the company had unilaterally changed the policy regarding free lunches after Collins' interview,
thereby violating § 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. See note 44 infra. The
National Labor Relations Board dismissed this charge because the issue could be determined
through the grievance procedure established in the parties' collective bargaining contract;
there was no evidence that arbitration of the dispute would not result in a decision compatible
with the purposes of the Act. The Board retained jurisdiction in order to consider possible
future charges that the dispute had not been settled or promptly submitted to arbitration,
that the proceedings had not been fair or that they had reached a result repugnant to the
National Labor Relations Act. 202 N.L.R.B. at 449-50.
6. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
7. This issue has not been extensively litigated in the context of investigatory interviews.
Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491, 492 (1971).
8. National Labor Relations Act § 1-18, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970) [hereinafter referred
to as the Act],
9. Section 8(a)(1) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157
...
Id. § 158(a)(1). Section 7 provides that employees shall have the right "to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection.
...
Id. § 157.
10. 202 N.L.R.B. at 446. Member Kennedy dissented on grounds discussed at note 17
infra. Member Penello dissented because it was clear from the record that the employer was
conducting an investigatory, rather than a disciplinary, interview. 202 N.L.R.B. at 446 n.2.
11. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973). The Board had ordered
the company to cease and desist from requiring any employee to participate in an interview
without representation if the employee had requested his union representative's presence and
had reasonable grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed might result in discipli-
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari of the Board's
3
appeal" and reversed the circuit court's decision.'
THE DECISION OF THE COURT

The Court found the Board's interpretation of section 7 of the Act
was a permissible construction of the language by the agency
charged with enforcing the Act. 4 The Court held that when an
employee seeks assistance in an investigatory encounter with his
employer, he engages in a protected concerted activity within the
literal wording of section 7.15 The Court discussed the nature and
extent of the right to union representation at investigatory interviews as recently developed by the Board in Quality Manufacturing
Co.'" and Mobil Oil Corp.'" According to these decisions, the right
nary action against him. 202 N.L.R.B. at 450. The court agreed that a basic purpose of § 7
was to allow employees to engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or protection.
It found, however, that there was no need for protection at an investigatory interview, and
an extension of the Act to such preliminary encounters between the employer and the employee was an overbroad interpretation of § 7. 485 F.2d at 1138. The court's position was
consistent with its earlier decision in Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969),
where it held that an employer's denial of an employee's request for representation at an
interview which dealt only with eliciting facts and imposed no consequences as the facts were
revealed did not violate §§ 8(a)(1) or 8(a)(5) of the Act. Id. at 145. The court rejected the
Board's attempt to distinguish this case from Weingarten on the basis that Texaco was
essentially a refusal to bargain case which did not put in issue any other § 7 rights. The court
adopted in full the language of the Fourth Circuit in NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d
1018 (4th Cir. 1973), which stated that by necessary implication § 7 rights were involved in
cases concerning the denial of representation at employer-employee interviews. 485 F.2d at
1137.
12. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 416 U.S. 969 (1974). The Court set this case for argument with ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 416 U.S. 968 (1974), which dealt with the same issue.
In Quality, an employee was discharged for refusing to attend an interview without representation. Two union stewards were suspended and one of them was ultimately dismissed for
seeking to represent the employee.
13. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). On the basis of its decision in
Weingarten, the Court also reversed the Fourth Circuit's contrary determination in Quality.
ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
14. 420 U.S. at 260.
15. Id. See notes 23-26 and accompanying text infra.
16. 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), enforcement denied, 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973). See note
12 supra. Member Kennedy had dissented because the § 8(a)(1) violation had been found on
the basis of the employee's subjective state of mind, which was contrary to the sound interpretation and administration of the Act. 195 N.L.R.B. at 201. He also felt that provisions for
union representation at investigatory interviews should be the product of the collective bargaining process. Id.
17. 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), enforcement denied, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973). In Mobil
Oil, the employer interviewed nine employees suspected of theft. Of the four who subse-
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arises only where the employee requests representation; the employee may waive the right and face the interview alone. 8 The right
exists only if the employee reasonably believes the investigation will
result in disciplinary action against him; 9 the reasonableness of his
belief is to be measured by objective standards taking into account
all of the circumstances.'" According to the Court, the employer has
several alternatives if the employee asserts his right to union representation in an appropriate situation. First, he may inform the employee that there will be no interview unless the employee participates without representation. If the employee refuses, the employer
is free to pursue his investigation without the interview and act
upon the information he obtains from other sources.2 Second, once
a union representative is admitted to the interview the employer
may restrict his participation. The employer has no obligation to
bargain with the union at an investigatory interview, and he may
insist upon hearing only the employee's version of the facts."
quently filed a charge, two had requested representation at the interviews. 196 N.L.R.B. at
1052 & n.2. The trial examiner dismissed the charges because there had been no decision to
discipline the employees prior to the interviews. In addition, disciplinary action was not
probable and those who conducted the interview had no authority to discuss discipline with
the employees. Id. at 1060. The Board reversed and found an unfair labor practice because
the employee was entitled to the protection of a representative due to his reasonable fear that
the interview would result in disciplinary action. Id. at 1052. Member Kennedy dissented on
the basis that the employee had no statutory right to such representation and that any such
right had to be based on contract. Id. at 1053. He felt the Board's decision was contrary to a
long line of cases in which similar denials had not been considered violations of the Act. Id.
He argued that the Board's new construction would protect employees actually guilty of
misconduct while excluding the innocent, since the former was the only group which could
reasonably fear discipline or discharge. Id. at 1055. He concluded that, as there was no
evidence that the employer had an anti-union motivation or any other statutorily proscribed
objective, the Board's new restrictions did not carry out the objectives of the Act. Id. at 1056.
The court of appeals denied enforcement on the grounds that such representation was not
concerted activity within the meaning of the Act. Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842,
847 (7th Cir. 1973). It also felt that many activities which can be described by the language
of § 7 are not in fact protected. Id. at 846.
18. 420 U.S. at 257. If the employee should waive the right of union representation, the
employer must determine whether the waiver was voluntary and informed. If it was not,
continuing the interview without a representative would violate § 8(a)(1). See Comment,
Union Presence in Disciplinary Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 329, 350 (1974).
19. 420 U.S. at 257.
20. Id. at 257-58 n.5. The Court felt the key objective fact in this case was that had the
employer been convinced Collins was guilty of theft, the collective bargaining agreement
would have permitted her discharge without further notice.
21. Id. at 258-59. This may be of little value if the employee whom the employer wished
to interview is the only individual who has the necessary information.
22. Id. at 259-60. Thus, the right to representation is qualified and does not eliminate
management's prerogatives in conducting investigatory interviews.
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The Court concluded the Board's interpretation was a permissible
and beneficial reading of the language of section 723 because the
right effectuated the basic purposes of the Act to protect employees'
rights of free association and self-organization by eliminating the
imbalance of economic power created when an employee confronts
his employer without assistance." Not only would the presence of a
union steward shield an employee from a perceived threat to his
continued employment, but it would also safeguard the interests of
the entire bargaining unit 5 at the time most beneficial to both employer and employee."6 The Court agreed that the Board's prior
decisions which appeared to preclude the right to representation at
investigatory interviews27 were not controlling, and approved the
Board's evolutionary approach to the interpretation of the Act,
which reflected changing patterns in industrial life-in this case,
the increased use of sophisticated security techniques to detect
employee theft.28 The Court criticized the court of appeals for its
independent determination that representation at an investigatory
encounter is unnecessary, because the question of when an employee
needs assistance is within the province of the Board's cumulative
expertise."
The primary dissent,"0 written by Justice Powell and joined by
Justice Stewart,"' noted the right to representation would probably
23. Id. at 262.
24. Id. at 261-62.
25. Id. at 260-61. The bargaining unit would be protected because representation would
insure the employer did not initiate or continue a practice of imposing discipline unjustly.
Id. The Court felt this was concerted activity comparable to situations where workmen
supported the grievance of a fellow worker by going out on strike. Id. at 261.
26. The Court suggested that a single employee might be too fearful or inarticulate to
accurately relate the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating circumstances. A union representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable factors,
thereby saving valuable production time. Id. at 262-63.
27. See notes 44-45 infra. The Court specifically reversed the decision in Texaco, Inc., v.
NLRB, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969) insofar as it held that no § 8 (a)(1) violation occured when
union representation was denied at investigatory interviews. 420 U.S. at 264. See note 11
supra.
28. 420 U.S. at 265. Undercover agents, lie detector tests and closed circuit television are
now being used by employers to detect employee thefts. Id. n.10.
29. Id. at 266-67.
30. In an opinion written for both Weingarten and Quality, Chief Justice Burger stated
he would remand the cases to allow the Board to fully explain why the new rule had been
established. He felt this was necessary to protect the integrity of the administrative process,
since the Board had not justified the "brief but spectacular evolution of the right." Id. at
268-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 269-75.
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also extend to non-unionized employees 2 and contended that an
investigatory interview was not concerted activity within the meaning of the Act.33 While section 7 protected rights essential to employee self-organization and the exercise of economic pressures in
bargaining with the employer, it did not define those rights.34 The
dissenters considered the wide range of purposes served by investigatory interviews, along with the fact that the right to representation at such interviews is frequently an important term in collective
bargaining negotiations, and concluded that Congress intended the
subject should be left to the bargaining process. 5
The dissenters also challenged the Court's view that recognition
of this right was the result of a logical evolutionary approach by the
Board." Justice Powell observed that in Dobbs Houses, Inc.,37 the
Board had adopted the trial examiner's analysis that nothing in the
Act obliged an employer to permit the presence of a union representative when the employer disciplined or admonished an employee,
especially where the employee's conduct was unrelated to legitimate
union or concerted activity. 8 He argued that although the Board
had modified its position in Texaco, Inc. " to the extent that it had
recognized the union's right to be present at a disciplinary hearing,4"
it was not until Quality Manufacturing Co.,4 ' decided one year before Weingarten, that the Board recognized the right at investigatory interviews.42 This history of past Board policy did not indicate
to the dissenters that the Board's change of position had resulted
43
from a logical evolutionary approach.
PRIOR BOARD POLICY

The extension of the right to representation and the conclusion
that employees may be engaged in protected concerted activities at
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 270 n.1.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 273-75.
Id. at 270-72.
145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964).
420 U.S. at 270-71.
168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967). See note 11 supra.
420 U.S. at 271.
195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972).
420 U.S. at 272.
Id. at 270-72.
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purely investigatory interviews represent a departure from the im-

plications of certain prior Board decisions. Although the Board attempted to distinguish its past decisions on the basis that they
involved only section 8(a)(5) violations," the earlier cases nonetheless established that not all interview encounters came within section 7 protected concerted activity. The Board had distinguished
fact-finding or investigatory interviews from disciplinary interviews,
and had found protected concerted activity only in the latter." In
Lafayette Electronics Corp.,4" a decision which preceded Quality by
only six weeks, the Board had reaffirmed its policy that the union
had no right to be present if the interview was investigatory or factfinding."1 This standard had been adopted by the courts of appeals
which considered the issue."
In order to bring disciplinary interviews which were unrelated to
44. Section 8(a)(5) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
" 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5) (1970). Collective bargaining is defined as the "performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment... Id. § 158(d).
In Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), the Board had argued that the earlier cases
had determined the issue only in terms of the employer's duty to bargain with the union, and
had not decided the issue as it related to the employee's right to request representation. Id.
at 198. The circuit courts had rejected this contention in enforcement proceedings. See note
11 supra.
45. See, e.g., Service Tech. Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 845 (1972) (no violation where interview
was conducted to find facts concerning threats against other employees); Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
192 N.L.R.B. 834 (1971) (case law was clear that the Act imposed no obligation to grant the
right to representation at an interview about the employee's alleged theft of money); Texaco,
Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 976 (1969) (interview concerning employee's alleged refusal to perform
assigned work was fact-finding and therefore denial of representation did not violate the Act);
Dayton Typo. Serv., Inc., 176 N.L.R.B. 357 (1969) (no violation because the interview was
investigatory and the employer had made no decision to discipline); Jacobe-Pearson Ford,
Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968) (no violation because management had not reached any decision to discipline employee who had refused to perform assigned work and was only interested
in hearing the employee's version of the incident); Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967)
(no violation when interview was intended to find facts behind allegations that employees
had left work site early and no disciplinary action resulted); Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B.
1565 (1964) (Act does not require the presence of a representative when the employer plans
to admonish or otherwise discipline an employee).
46. 194 N.L.R.B. 491 (1971)(evidence clearly showed that interrogations had a factfinding purpose).
47. Id. at 492.
48. See, e.g., NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. NLRB, 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Quality Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir.
1973); Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB. 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969).
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union organization within the scope of section 7 protected concerted
activity,4" the Board had to determine that at such interviews employees were engaged in lawful activities" for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. It appears these
terms were closely related; ordinarily, protected concerted activities
had been limited to situations involving employee self-organization
or collective bargaining,' as the Act had been primarily designed to
protect those activities." It was subsequently held, however, that
the Board could rely solely on the right to engage in c6ncerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection in finding an
employer had violated an employee's section 7 rights. Accordingly,
the Board found disciplinary action a violation of the Act where the
employees' conduct was designed to influence the selection of a
person for a position which directly affected their earnings; 4 where
the employees circulated a petition as a preliminary step towards
obtaining higher wages;55 where they left their work site to seek legal
assistance in obtaining a traditional bonus which had been withheld; or where they acted in concert to obtain permission to work
overtime.5 7
49. The Board has found a § 8(a)(1) violation where the interview concerned the employees' union activities. United Aircraft Corp., 179 N.L.R.B. 935 (1969).
50. Concerted activity is not protected if it is unlawful, even if it is related to selforganization or collective bargaining. See, e.g., Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950)
(employer did not violate Act when he discharged employees engaged in unlawful slowdown
to obtain higher wages).
51. The two terms are contained in the language of § 7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See Joanna
Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1949), where an employee was not protected
when circulating a petition concerning a personal conflict with his supervisor; the court held
that concerted activities related only to collective bargaining and self-organization.
52. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (§
7 rights protected not for their own sake but to implement policy of minimizing industrial
strife by encouraging collective bargaining); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300
(1964) (central purpose of the Act is to protect employee self-organization and the process of
collective bargaining from the employer's interference); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395 (1952) (Act designed to promote industrial peace by encouraging voluntary
agreements); see Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319 (1951).
53. NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1948).
54. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1947), enforced, 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir.
1948).
55. Salt River Valley Water Users Ass'n, 99 N.L.R.B. 849 (1952), enforced, 206 F.2d 325
(9th Cir. 1953).
56. Modern Motors, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 964 (1951), enforced in part, 198 F.2d 925 (8th Cir.
1952) (activity involved no more than a work stoppage and the concerted presentation of a
grievance in a reasonable attempt to have a problem resolved).
57. NLRB v. Schwartz, 146 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1945) (the right of employees outside a
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When the Board found protected concerted activity in these situations, however, the employees' conduct was usually related to a
dispute with their employer over the terms and conditions of their
employment. The employees' actions in these disputes perhaps did
not rise to the level of collective bargaining, but they were sufficiently serious to bear a close relationship to it. A dispute had to
be meaningful, as a mere gripe was considered too inchoate to merit
protection.58
However, the Board apparently did not rely on its development
of the right to mutual aid or protection when considering whether
an employer's denial of an employee's request for representation at
an interview violated the Act. 5 Instead, the Board based its determinations on the employee's right to engage in collective bargaining. The right to engage in collective bargaining includes within its
ambit the discussion of discipline,'" and accordingly the Board relied on the disciplinary nature of the interview to trigger the employees' right to representation. Thus, in determining whether representation should have been permitted, the Board considered important the employer's plans to discuss with the employee the consequences of his alleged misconduct;' the employer's commitment
to disciplinary action;6" the potential for disciplinary action as a
result of the interview; 3 and whether those who conducted the interview had any authority to make a decision concerning discipline. 4
union to engage in lawful activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection is specified
by the Act). See also NLRB v. J.I. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1952) (employees protected
when they attempted to instigate a walkout in protest of the discharge of another employee);
Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944) (mutual aid or protection and
concerted activities include the right to join other workers quitting work in protest over
treatment of a fellow employee).
58. NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1953).
59. It is not clear that the Board's ultimate conclusion on the issue prior to Weingarten
would have differed had it relied on the right to mutual aid or protection, since it is arguable
whether a meaningful dispute over the conditions and terms of employment exists at a purely
investigatory interview.
60. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 360 (1940) (contracts between employer
and individual employee illegally restrained employees' right to bargain collectively when it
included term which provided there would be no mediation or arbitration over discharge).
61. Texaco, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1969) (employee interviewed concerning alleged theft of kerosene).
62. Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574, 578 (1967).
63. Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 599-600 (1968).
64. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. 834, 836 (1971). See Brodie, Union Representation
and the DisciplinaryInterview, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1973), for a discussion
of some additional factors which may be considered relevant when determining whether the
denial of representation was proper.
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Since the disciplinary nature of the interview brought it within the
scope of collective bargaining and thereby created the employee's
right to representation, employees seeking representation at purely
investigatory interviews were not protected and the employer's denial of this representation was not a violation of the Act.
IMPACT OF

Weingarten

As a result of Weingarten, the relationship between the interview
and collective bargaining is no longer relevant in the context of
investigatory interviews. 5 The Board's new standard replaces the
question of whether the interview was investigatory or disciplinary
in nature with the question of whether the employee could
reasonably fear that the interview would result in disciplinary action.6" The basis for this new test is the employee's right to the
mutual aid or assistance of his fellow workers when his continued
job security is jeopardized. The Board's analysis of disciplinary interviews apparently remains unaffected; it has, however, embarked
on a new development of the "mutual aid or protection" language
of section 7 by extending it to investigatory interviews.
The Board did not fully explain its rationale for abandoning what
appeared to be the established rule governing union representation
at interviews. Further, the Board did not extensively review its prior
decisions except to assert that it had not previously decided this
precise issue, arguing that those cases had essentially concerned the
union's right to represent an employee rather than the employee's
independent right to representation. 7 Its new interpretation seems
based upon a literal reading of section 7 of the Act 8 and the argu65. Of course, these factors are still relevant if the issue is whether the interview was
disciplinary in nature. This question could arise in an investigatory context if the employee
effectively waives his right to representation but the union claims its right to be present may
not be waived because the interview is disciplinary rather than fact-finding.
66. The Board first applied this right in Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972), where
both regular employees and union stewards were disciplined for insisting on the right to
representation. The rule was later extended in Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972), in
which employees had been discharged for their alleged misconduct, and in J. Weingarten,
Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973), where it does not appear that the employee suffered any
discipline.
67. See note 44 supra.
68. The Board argued that if the employee believes the interview may jeopardize his job
security and requests union representation, he is seeking to act "in concert," as provided by
§ 7, to protect his continued employment. Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972).
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ment that recognition of the right was justified by changes in the
patterns of industrial life." The dissenting justices criticized what
they felt was an abrupt, unexplained change of policy,7" but the
majority accepted both the new rule and the Board's superior competence in formulating it.7
CONCLUSION

Since the right to representation at investigatory interviews is
new, its effect on labor-management relations is not yet clear. The
decision does, however, suggest several potential problems. It is
apparent that management has lost a bargaining item for future
contract negotiations now that the right to representation has been
granted under the Act.7" It has not been proven that the rule will in
any way benefit management or that it will necessarily help the
employee,73 especially since the employer may significantly restrict
69. The Board felt that employees' awareness of the increasingly sophisticated security
techniques utilized by employers might increase their feelings of apprehension and decrease
their ability to defend themselves adequately if they were accused of misconduct. Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 6, NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). In light of
this argument, it is interesting to note that Collins referred to Loss Prevention Specialist
Hardy as a detective. 202 N.L.R.B. at 448 n.5.
70. Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the Court had suggested some good reasons for
adopting the new rule, but these reasons could not be found in the Board's decision. 420 U.S.
at 269 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 265-66.
72. As the Court noted, the right to representation has been a standard topic of collective
bargaining. Id. at 267. Justice Powell observed that the employer in Mobil Oil Corp., 196
N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972) had successfully prevailed in negotiations with the union in resisting
their demands for a contract provision that the employer must meet with the union prior to
taking disciplinary action. 420 U.S. at 275 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting). Of course, bargaining
can still occur as to the parameters and implementation of the right, but it is unclear whether
the union can waive the right to representation at interviews. Id.
73. The Board asserted that the right to representation would reduce the chance that the
employee would be coerced at an investigatory interview and would benefit other employees
to the extent that it would promote fair hearings and discipline consistent with past practice.
Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 2. The Court stated that such representation could also
aid the employer since it would help him obtain the facts and thereby save valuable production time. 420 U.S. at 262-63. That reasoning was rejected by the Weingarten Company,
which argued it was speculation that union representation would insure the full and truthful
version of the incident, the presentation of an understandable story, less serious disciplinary
action, or the avoidance of coercion by the employer. It felt representation would have a
detrimental effect on a genuine fact-finding process, especially where the employee was being
questioned about a fellow employee's conduct. Brief for Respondent at 20, NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
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the participation of the representative present at the interview.74 In
addition, while the disciplinary/investigatory distinction may have
been inadequate because it did not provide clear guidelines to employers as to what was permissible conduct,75 the new rule, which
depends on the employer's determination of the objective reasonableness of the employee's fears for his continued job security, appears to be no clearer.7" Both employee and employer may be unsure
77
whether union representation is appropriate in a given situation.
It seems the new standard, like the old, will compel a case by case
determination; indeed, this process has already begun.78
Despite its ambiguities, the rule does have a certain attractiveness; it parallels the prevailing philosophy concerning the rights of
the accused in confrontations with those who may ultimately prosecute him, although the Board has specifically rejected this anal74. 420 U.S. at 273-74 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting). Perhaps more important is the possibility an employee may lose the benefit of an interview if he insists upon representation and
the employer refuses to proceed in the union representative's presence. Id. at 258.
75. The determination of whether an employer's denial of representation was permissible
necessarily involved an examination of the nature of the interview in each instance. In view
of the variety of facts the Board considered in resolving the issue, the employer could not
easily predict in advance whether denial of representation would be permissible. See notes
60-64 and accompanying text supra. For an extensive discussion by Trial Examiner Miller of
the difficulties inherent in the investigatory/disciplinary distinction see Texaco, Inc., 179
N.L.R.B. 976, 981-86 (1969).
76. For several examples of the difficulties which the employer may face under the new
rule see Member Kennedy's dissent in Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1054-55 (1972).
Although the Court stated the employee's fears would be judged objectively, 420 U.S. at 25758 n.5, Member Kennedy argued in Mobil that the determination whether the employer was
guilty of an unfair labor practice would ultimately depend on the state of mind of the
employee; this was, in his opinion, a purely subjective test. 196 N.L.R.B. at 1054. This
argument was also made by the United States Chamber of Commerce in its Amicus Curiae
Brief at 13, NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). See note 20 supra.
77. The employee, of course, may assert the right only when he has reasonable grounds
to fear that disciplinary action may result from the interview. If he asserts the right in an
inappropriate situation, he could be subjecting himself to legitimate disciplinary action on
grounds of insubordination for refusing to participate in the interview. If the employer misjudges the circumstances, however, he may later be required to reinstate a legitimately
discharged employee or rescind other legitimate discipline because he committed an unfair
labor practice by denying representation during the hearing.
78. The Board applied the new rule in two cases while Weingarten was pending. In New
York Tel. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1973), an employee was coerced into an interview without
his representative; the Board found a violation even though there had been no discussion but
the imposition of discipline. Member Kennedy, dissenting in part, felt this case confirmed
his suspicions about the feasibility of the rule. In Western Elec. Co., 205 N.L.R.B. 195 (1973),
no violation of § 8(a)(1) was found because the employer terminated the interview when the
employee refused to participate without representation.

1976

Recent Decisions

ogy.' 9 Nevertheless, by affording this greater protection to employees on statutory grounds, the Board is perhaps indicating that it
intends to take a more expansive view of its responsibility to protect
the process of employee self-organization and collective bargaining. 0 The Board may accomplish this result by developing the separation of "mutual aid or protection" from union organization and
collective bargaining which it has begun in Weingarten.
Thomas A. Berret

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964-TITLE VII-AFFIRMATIVE

ACTION IN

HIRING-PERSONS PROTECTED-The United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey has held that a white male is not a
member of any class protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and may not invoke the protection of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's guidelines which require that any standardized test which serves as a basis for hiring by an employer must
be job-related.
Mele v. United States Department of Justice, 395 F. Supp. 592
(D.N.J. 1975).
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW),
Local 52, administered an affirmative action program' formulated
79. In Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp., 194 N.L.R.B. 491 (1971), the trial examiner
found the general counsel's argument that employees were entitled to representation was
based on the principles underlying the United States Supreme Court decision in Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). He rejected this argument on the grounds that Escobedo
turned on a constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel, while the right sought by the
employees was a contract right. 194 N.L.R.B. at 494.
80. Cf. the Board's statement in Weingarten that
[it] could not and did not immediately articulate all the rights and duties inherent
in Section 7. In its early years the Board was mainly concerned with more obvious
violations of the Act, as many employers resisted the basic concepts of selforganization and collective bargaining. With the passage of time, acceptance of selforganization and collective bargaining has increased, and the Board has had to deal
with new, and often more subtle practices which are nonetheless inimical to the purposes and policies of the Act.
Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 5-6.
1. Affirmative action plans assure positive steps will be taken to achieve equal employment opportunity for minority groups. The concept involves more than simply refraining from

